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Abdel Fattah el-Sisi came to power after the military ousted President Morsi 
in July 2013 following widespread protests and strikes. With the tenth an-
niversary of the Arab Spring uprising approaching, it has become clear that 
civil–military relations, infrastructure development, and population growth 
remain three interrelated challenges for Egypt that have persisted through-
out the last decade.
 • The military is historically tied to politics and remains a highly popular insti-
tution in Egyptian society. Simultaneously, socio-economic grievances and its 
importance as an employer continue to push the military into Egypt’s domestic 
politics.
 • Infrastructure development is on a split course: On one hand, because of its 
resources and manpower, the military can invest in mega-projects in hopes of 
long-term economic benefits. On the other hand, urbanisation has remained 
stagnant due to the crackdown on booming illegal, albeit urgently needed, 
housing.
 • There is acknowledgement among policymakers that population growth is stif-
ling infrastructure and development, yet there is little incentive for change. 
Measures targeting women fail to gain traction because of societal pressure to 
bear children, and because access to education, employment, and political par-
ticipation remain unsafe given rampant sexual violence in public spaces.
Policy Implications
Through supporting socio-economic advancement in Egypt, Germany and the 
EU can facilitate the military’s withdrawal from politics over the long term. Ac-
tive support for infrastructure development implemented by civilian actors will 
over time reduce the need for the military’s economic engagement. Improving 
women’s safety will enable their access to work and political participation, which 
in turn can lower birthrates more effectively than the provision of birth control 
alone.
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Egypt after the Arab Spring: Three Points of Departure
Ten years since the start of the Arab Spring, Egypt has gone through periods of 
widespread unrest, general instability, and social changes. Economic grievances 
once drove people to protest in the streets, demanding social justice, dignity, and 
bread. Today, the same socio-economic grievances that sparked mass protests per-
sist, with little prospect of improvement in the short to medium term. Egypt also 
continues to be one of the most densely populated countries on earth, its popula-
tion having exceeded 100 million earlier this year. Taken together, these aspects 
represent important reasons for the military’s recurring involvement in domestic 
politics. The Egyptian Army ousted President Mohammed Morsi in 2013 by coup 
d’état. Previously, it had defected from Morsi’s predecessor, Hosni Mubarak, even-
tually ousting the Mubarak regime.
Socio-economic grievances, steep population growth, and militarised gov-
ernance are three central challenges that continue to drive Egypt’s trajectory and 
threaten its prospects of democratisation. But because these challenges remain 
pervasive, it is important to investigate not only how they have changed since Ab-
del Fattah el-Sisi came to power, but also how they impact each other. Population 
growth not only amplifies many of the existing socio-economic grievances – it is also 
a product of them. In the absence of social security and eldercare schemes, fami-
lies continue to rely on children for survival and as future providers. The existing, 
oversaturated labour market cannot absorb the abundance of young people, leaving 
many unemployed. Women suffer under immense societal pressure to bear children 
and do not have safe access to education and employment given rampant sexual 
violence towards them in the public space. Additionally, Egypt has a pronounced 
male youth bulge, which is of direct relevance for civil–military relations. Soldiers 
join and stay with the military to escape poverty and unemployment, sharing the 
same grievances as the civilian population. Because the make-up of the Egyptian 
military itself reflects underlying societal grievances, it is more and more rendered 
an independent political actor with responsibilities and alliances to each the regime 
and the people, making structural disentanglement from politics onerous.
The Role of the Military: Moderniser, Ruler, and Employer
An important starting point in disentangling Egyptian politics is civil–military rela-
tions. Military meddling in civilian affairs has been a recurring issue in the MENA 
region for decades. Maintaining balanced civil–military relations is crucial for long-
term prospects of democratisation because civilian supremacy – meaning a military 
completely subordinate to civilian rule – constitutes a fundamental prerequisite of 
democracy. The coup in the summer of 2013 that ousted Egypt’s first civilian presi-
dent was preceded by a long history of military involvement dating back to colonial 
independence gained through a military coup by Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1952. With 
the exception of Mohammed Morsi, in fact, all Egyptian heads of state have had a 
military career. This reflects that political mingling is written into the institutional 
make-up and understanding of Egyptian military professionalism. However, mili-
tary entanglement can also be driven by infrastructural and developmental needs, 
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unemployment, and absence of welfare, as the decade since the Arab Spring exem-
plifies.
Understanding of Egypt’s civil–military relations in the West is often limited 
to political representation, such as the head of state’s previous military career or 
appearance in uniform, post-military political careers, or direct interventions into 
civilian politics in the form of coups d’état. But coups indicate only that civilian 
oversight has already broken down, and do not necessarily offer insight into the 
causes and process of this breakdown. From the 1950s to today, Egypt remains a 
peculiar case with regards to military entanglement in civilian affairs, with little 
prospect of change. Data from the Arab Barometer in Egypt further highlights that 
the military enjoys relatively high levels of trust and confidence among the popula-
tion compared to the government, parliament, judiciary, and the police, even after 
an overall decline post-2011 (Arab Barometer 2020).
There is little consensus in the broader defence economics literature about military 
impact on industrial development and socio-economic advancement. On one hand, 
it is touted as driver of modernisation through spin-offs and skill transfer, especial-
ly with regards to engineering and inventions, when the army operates at a higher 
manufacturing standard than the civilian industry in a given country. On the other 
hand, increased prioritisation of military production and expenditure often goes at 
the expense of spending on health, education, and welfare services. In Egypt, the 
military remains an important player in infrastructure and the economy. Under Sisi, 
the Egyptian Army, building on its long history of entrepreneurialism, expanded its 
business practices further, even signing deals with foreign firms (Al-Mary Al-Youm 
2020). Furthermore, the military also produces solar panels, chemical compounds, 
and computer circuits, and runs motor companies (Al-Masry Al-Youm 2020). The 
Ministry of Military Production also lists their other, civilian-oriented products, 
ranging from smaller household items to industrial machinery.
With continued unemployment, now also fuelled by the COVID-19 pandemic, 
the military has emerged as a comparatively stable employer, offering pensions and 
insurance and providing social welfare, which are all especially relevant benefits 
Military Government Judiciary Police
2011 81,90% 44,90% 56,90% 22,30%










Question: "I’m going to name a number of institutions. For each 
one, please tell me how much trust you have in them."




Trust in Egyptian 
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given the absence of this service provision by the civilian government, overall de-
creased tax revenues (World Bank 2020), and the collapse of the tourism sector 
since the Arab Spring. Through amendments to military retirement law (Egypt To-
day 2020), military pension payments have even been increased a few times un-
der Sisi, such as in 2015 (Al-Masry Al-Youm 2015) and as recently as April 2020. 
Additionally, widespread poverty pushes primarily young men to remain with the 
military beyond conscription, further adding to its manpower and socio-economic 
relevance.
Historical legacies and therefore precedent and experience in policymaking 
continue to draw Egyptian armed forces into the political arena. At the same time, 
the military is pushed into the political sphere due to infrastructural demands and 
grievances that threaten to destabilise the country. Civil–military relations in Egypt 
encompass more than just the military’s political representation. Between Mubarak 
and Sisi, entangled civil–military relations have remained a constant, as have the 
widespread popularity of and trust in the military. High military approval rates not 
only increase its socio-political importance in politics, but also foster a sense of 
responsibility and loyalty to the civilian society that is distinct from the military’s 
relationship to the regime itself. Paradoxically, the imbalance in civil–military rela-
tions continues to be driven by the very same grievances that drove people to mass 
protests to oust the Mubarak regime in 2011. One of these issues is infrastructural 
development, or more specifically, the housing needs of an ever-growing popula-
tion.
Infrastructural Changes: Between Mega-Projects and  
Demolitions
After coming into power, Sisi’s regime promised big changes to a country still in up-
roar over grievances on every level and strikes in every sector of the economy. The 
phenomenon of introducing mega-projects or big reforms after coming to power is 
almost traditional in Egypt: Nasser is associated with the construction of the Aswan 
Dam and the nationalisation of the Suez Canal, Anwar al-Sadat is credited with 
economic openings, and Mubarak with big neoliberal reforms, road constructions, 
and phone circuits. Sisi’s administration has similarly launched mega-projects, in-
cluding the further development of the Suez Canal Zone, the erection of the Grand 
Egyptian Museum in Giza, and the construction of a new desert capital city east of 
Cairo, a project launched in 2015. Currently, the Ministry of Defence and the Egyp-
tian military also list other national projects on their websites, including the con-
struction of wheat storage silos, cross-country motorways, hospitals, and bridges, 
along with general urban development of slum areas.
In general, infrastructural development in Egypt under Sisi is torn in different 
directions in an unprecedented way. Demographic growth in Egypt is pushing the 
need for accessible housing while straining existing infrastructure, basic utilities, 
and public transportation. Since the end of the Arab Spring, Egypt has seen another 
boom in illegal housing. This problem is propelled by an urban population that is 
densely concentrated around a relatively small strip of land. Since 2011, builders 
have exploited the post-Arab Spring chaos, building apartment complexes without 
obtaining official permits or abiding by security measures (Alsharif 2014). To regu-
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larise these illegal buildings, citizens must pay steep fees. Sisi’s government has 
put forth a deadline for this year by which citizens must legalise their buildings or 
face demolition, the ostensible reason being to conserve arable land (Abdel Ghany 
2020). As the civilian government is cracking down on illegal housing, it has not 
been able to meet urgent demands for affordable housing against the backdrop of 
continued economic crises. Housing complexes are urgently needed, and the demo-
lition of these (albeit illegal) units leaves people homeless or struggling to find the 
resources to pay for required permits and fees. However, as building blocks are 
erected, the electrical grid has seen fewer upgrades, resulting in frequent to almost 
daily blackouts. Likewise, road and traffic conditions remain chaotic.
At the same time, the military continues to invest in mega-projects because it 
has the resources, manpower, and expertise to implement these projects. But this 
approach leaves little space for civilian oversight or formalised accountability vis-à-
vis civilian demands. Moreover, while cross-country motorways or the Suez Canal 
Development Project will likely benefit the economy in the long term, they offer 
few short-term pay-offs to the average Egyptian in need of a roof over their head. 
Mega-projects attract foreign investors, are internationally visible, and create some 
employment. The symbolism attached to such projects plays an important role in 
domestic politics, helping secure approval and legitimacy, especially given contin-
ued economic grievances that may provoke civil unrest. Against this backdrop, the 
expansion of the Suez Canal almost seems like a deliberate nod to Nasser’s nation-
alisation of the same canal in 1956.
When looking far into the future in hopes of a long-term economic upturn, im-
mediate housing needs and current economic crises are easily overlooked – which 
ultimately stifles long-term pay-offs as well. Given the rapid growth in population, 
keeping up with housing demands becomes a priority of unforeseen urgency that 
continuously draws the military into the political sphere. The effect of such mega-
projects remains highly ambivalent: their implementation may on short notice help 
the agent implementing them to gain political legitimacy, but at the same time it 
may undermine that legitimacy in the long run. Mega-projects might offer some 
pay-offs in the future – but unless grievances in the present are also addressed, that 
future will remain out of reach.
Demography and Gendered Challenges
A latent issue in Egypt is outsized population growth on a relatively small strip 
of land. As of this year, Egypt’s population exceeded 100 million (see Figure 2) 
and has been skewed towards younger cohorts for decades. The problem of Egypt’s 
population growth existed long before Sisi’s regime, and there is little indication 
that it is likely to change soon. This population growth, however, stands within a 
specific socio-economic context that needs to be considered. Raging inflation and 
unemployment have persisted through the Arab Spring to today, with little prospect 
for improvement in sight. Urban design and infrastructure projects are presently 
characterised by either the immediate need to house the ever-growing population 
with little space available, or the need to secure political approval and avoid unrest. 
Very few investments in public spaces are not focused on living, commuting, trade, 
and basic infrastructure such as sanitation, which comes at the expense of parks 
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and other recreational spaces. In a similar vein to physical living conditions, the 
civilian government also continues to struggle with providing social security and 
welfare services to the continuously growing population.
Some attempts have been undertaken by the current administration to encourage 
family planning and provide contraception and education, especially in rural ar-
eas (Awadallah 2017). Sisi has repeatedly stated that, alongside terrorism, demo-
graphic challenges pose the biggest threat to Egyptian national development, with 
his government launching a campaign in 2019 advocating that two children are 
enough (Masri 2019). Presently, the fertility rate in Egypt is approximately 3.3 
births per woman (World Bank 2020). Egypt’s population is not only young and 
heavily skewed towards younger cohorts, but there is also a pronounced bulge in 
both male and female cohorts between 19 and 25. The distribution of age cohorts, 
rather than just the total population alone, has socio-political implications. Popula-
tions with male youth bulges are associated with more political violence, especially 
in combination with the presence of economic grievances; a large surplus in the 
labour force cannot be absorbed by an oversaturated labour market, a situation that 
contributes to youth unemployment (Urdal 2012).
Employment and job prospects – especially among the youth – have seen little 
improvement (see Figure 2) even as those who do complete tertiary-level educa-
tion find themselves unemployed (Habibi and Hamidi 2016). And yet, population 
growth remains relentless, raising the question of what drives it and how it impacts 
existing grievances. In the absence of social welfare and pensions, families tend to 
invest in children as a social security plan. At the same time, education remains 
inaccessible and underfunded, which dampens prospects of social mobility beyond 
mere survival. Appeals regarding family planning therefore remain ineffective, be-
cause there is little incentive to not rely on children, even though family may ensure 
little beyond mere survival and some form of eldercare. Simultaneously, gendered 
and other societal pressures are driving family planning despite continued griev-
ances. In Egyptian society, women and men are often not considered as full adults 
unless they are married and – especially for women – have children. Across social 
strata, women’s social status remains conditional on their reproductive capability. 
Meanwhile, these pressures clash with the reality of high living costs and unafford-
able living spaces that prevent youths from realising their family planning (Singer-
man 2013). This mismatch likely feeds into the desirability of children: precisely be-
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is a conveyor of social status in families that are financially well-off, or is presented 
as a divine blessing (rizq or baraka) despite hardship in poorer families. 
The specifically male youth bulge in turn plays a role in the military’s political 
bargaining; underlying socio-economic problems in society are also reflected in the 
military itself, as the military conscripts from the general population. As outlined 
in the Arab Barometer, the Egyptian military continues to be highly popular with 
the people. It is well known in Egyptian society that Nasser and Sadat both came 
from poor families in rural Egypt, ascended through the military ranks, and in-
troduced redistributive policies. Coupled with continued popularity, rising through 
the military ranks is widely seen as a chance at upward social mobility, which draws 
especially young men into the military beyond conscription. Low- to mid-ranking 
recruits therefore often share the same grievances as the civilian population, as 
many men remain in the army beyond conscription to escape poverty. The defection 
from Mubarak in 2011 and the coup in 2013 were both preceded by popular demand 
that the military side with protesters and oust the current regime. These instances 
demonstrate that, in Egypt, regime and military are not a unitary agent – rather, the 
military maintains its own relationship to citizens and can act independently from 
the regime. Shared grievances among soldiers and citizens likely foster a sense of 
responsibility and loyalty towards citizens over the regime. The regime defections 
in the past therefore underscore that military relations towards civil society should 
not be underestimated and will gain relevance the more men join the army to escape 
from poverty.
Policymakers and international organisations in the past have frequently ad-
dressed Egypt’s overpopulation and proposed a variety of measures aiming to reduce 
birth rates. Yet measures targeting women that are usually associated with lowering 
the birth rate – such as in the realms of education, employment, and healthcare – 
have not gained traction in Egyptian society. While education in general is inacces-
sible and ineffective with regards to employment prospects, these challenges affect 
women to a greater extent. Access to employment begins with women’s safety – on 
their commutes to work and in any public space. Sexual assault and sexualised vio-
lence towards women, often politically motivated, has increased greatly since the 
Arab Spring (Grove 2015; Tadros 2013). Ongoing gendered violence in the public 
space not only discourages women’s participation in public life and politics, but also 
confines them to their homes, whether because they choose to stay home or because 
they are kept home by their families. Ensuring availability of birth control will also 
not gain traction without an underlying medical infrastructure and regular access 
to healthcare beyond basic reproductive services.
As long as there is little prospect of social security and pensions being pro-
vided, incentives to raise children as a means to secure future social security will 
continue to be pervasive. Likewise, repeated appeals to use contraception will not 
gain traction if societal prestige and reputation remain conditional on family sta-
tus, especially for women. Rather than discouraging people from having children, 
economic grievances are more likely to raise overall political dissatisfaction and 
political tension. Poverty and unemployment will also continue to draw young men 
into the army, which inadvertently strengthens the military’s political influence, 
bargaining power, and socio-economic significance in Egypt. And lastly, infrastruc-
tural development will remain torn in different directions as long as population 
growth continues. Demographic developments, therefore, should not be seen out-
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side their socio-economic context, but rather as both a result and a driver of those 
same circumstances.
In summary, Egypt’s overpopulation is an almost tautological problem. Infra-
structural needs and grievances are high because of Egypt’s high birth rate, but 
Egypt continues to have a high birth rate at least in part because of those griev-
ances. The population’s specific make-up not only strains the labour market but 
also impacts the army’s relations with the regime vis-à-vis the people. Not only do 
civilians appeal to the army to step into politics on their behalf on the grounds of 
shared grievances, but the army itself may be inclined to maintain loyalty to the 
people as protector and arbiter because of soldiers’ socio-economic descent and the 
military’s overall popularity among the people.
Sisi’s Egypt: Haunted by the Past
For foreign policymakers in Germany and the European Union it is important to 
understand that Egypt’s long path to stability and democratisation begins not with 
elections, but rather with balancing civil–military relations and mitigating socio-
economic grievances that most likely require military manpower. Measures to tack-
le population control must include ensuring women’s safety in public spaces given 
the unbridled sexual violence that bars them from accessing education and em-
ployment, which ultimately reduces the effectiveness of measures that have already 
been taken to address population growth.
Overpopulation, slow infrastructural development, and unbalanced civil–mili-
tary relations have existed in previous regimes but have worsened since the Arab 
Spring and will likely persist over the next decade. Overall, Sisi’s Egypt is haunted 
by its past. The main challenge going forward will therefore not just be to turn 
the corner, but to make any dent at all. Egypt remains an important partner to 
Germany and the European Union, as well as an important ally to NATO in the 
“War on Terror” and a geostrategic partner in the Middle East and North Africa. 
Critique regarding domestic civil–military relations from European stakeholders 
is often hyper-focused on the political representation of the armed forces with lit-
tle understanding of socio-economic factors pushing or pulling the military into 
politics. Future democratic growth in Egypt is conditional on breaking the cycle be-
tween economic grievances and military inference. Herein it is crucial for European 
policymakers to put aside Westernised ideals of what democratisation should look 
like under conditions of full civilian supremacy, because these ideals have simply 
never corresponded with the reality of Egyptian politics. The Egyptian military’s 
long history of leaving and returning to the barracks since the country’s colonial in-
dependence has ingrained it into Egypt’s institutional framework as a constant pol-
itical agent, a fact that is unlikely to change in the near future. Societal structures 
and grievances are reflected in the army’s recruits, creating a semblance of political 
representation and loyalty towards the Egyptian people, which in turn detaches it 
from the regime and influences political bargaining between incumbent regime, op-
posing elites, and citizens. 
Understanding this circular dynamic is crucial for future decision-making with 
regards to developmental aid and foreign investments, especially in infrastructure 
projects. German policymakers can facilitate a military withdrawal from politics 
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by mitigating the factors most likely drawing the military into politics. Active en-
couragement of foreign investment in favour of civilian actors in infrastructural 
development, including improving electrical grids, road conditions, and public 
transportation safety, not only lessens the need for military manpower to undertake 
these tasks in the long term, but also enables women’s safe and regular access to 
the labour force and political participation. In a similar vein, support for a welfare 
infrastructure will lessen the need to depend on many children as a means of social 
security and eldercare.
Shortcomings in infrastructure and urban development are amplified by popu-
lation growth. To break the vicious cycle of population growth and socio-economic 
grievances, European policymakers must pay particularly close attention to Egyp-
tian women’s safety and well-being to ensure not only their political participation, 
but also their access to education, employment, and healthcare. Egypt’s population 
growth is not just an exacerbator of grievances and lack of welfare but is also a 
product of them. Measures already taken by Germany and the EU will continue to 
fail to gain traction if surrounding grievances are not mitigated. Improving road 
conditions and public transportation not only supports overall infrastructural de-
velopment, but also contributes to increasing women’s safety on Egyptian streets. 
Sexualised violence is a central factor keeping women away from education and the 
labour force and preventing them from equally partaking in public life and political 
representation, which limits their societal role to reproduction and domestic la-
bour. Educating women as a means to reduce rates of childbirth must therefore be 
accompanied by educating men and specifically male political stakeholders about 
women’s rights and family planning, as well as training law enforcement in effec-
tive prosecution of sexualised violence. Germany and the European Union should 
therefore not limit measures to counter population control to the mere provision of 
contraception and related education to girls and women.
Under these circumstances, withdrawing aid and limiting ties with Egypt as 
a punitive measure because of population growth or the military’s political role – 
both century-old issues – will do far more damage than good to the people of Egypt, 
particularly Egyptian women. To find a way forward in Egypt means to first find a 
way out of the military/grievance loop and to defuse the urgency of infrastructural 
needs by enabling women to partake in societal life beyond their role as childbear-
ers. Otherwise, Egypt’s past will continue to haunt its future.
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